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THE ACCUMULATED EARNINGS TAX AND THE
REASONABLE NEEDS OF THE BUSINESS: A PROPOSAL
HOMER L. ELLIoTT
The accumulated earnings tax has been referred to as "a penalty on
success itself."' Of all the taxes imposed upon business, this is probably
one of the most unpopular, involving an after the fact verdict on manage-
ment's business judgment. As long as substantial differences exist in
the tax rates imposed upon the corporation on the one hand and upon
the individual on the other, however, there will continue to be a need
for such tax "as a barrier to . . . tax avoidance." 2
Presently two tests, one subjective and the other objective, are used
to determine whether the tax will be imposed. The subjective test is
derived from section 532(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
which provides that the accumulated earnings tax is to be imposed
if the corporation was formed or availed of to avoid income tax on its
shareholders by permitting earnings and profits to accumulate. In
short, this test is based on the subjective intent of the shareholders in
accumulating earnings and profits. The objective test is derived from
section 533(a) and (c) of the Code. Section 533(a) creates a pre-
sumption that the purpose of avoidance is present if earnings are ac-
cumulated beyond the reasonable needs of the corporation's business.
Section 535(c) provides a credit in computing accumulated taxable
income for "such part of the earnings and profits for the taxable year
as are retained for the reasonable needs of the business." 3
The thesis of this discussion is that the subjective test no longer
serves a valid purpose, and should therefore be discarded in favor of
the objective test, one based on whether the accumulation serves the
reasonable needs of the business.
*A.B., 1960, Indiana University; J.D., 1969, College of William and Mary. Member of
the firm: Steptoe and Johnson, Washington, D. C.
1. Lang, Section 531-The Burden of Success, U. So. CAL. 1968 TAx IsT. 279.
2. J. HALL, SmA.u BusmNsS AND THE NOIErRATED INCOME TAx STRucrura: STUDY
PREPARED FOR THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE ECONOMIC REPORT, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 682
(1955).
3. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 535 (c).
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THE ACCUMULATED EARNINGS TAx
Background
Precedents for taxing undistributed profits date back to at least 1864,
when "gains and profits of all companies, whether incorporated or [not
were to] be included in estimating the annual gains, profits, or income
of any person entitled to the same, whether divided or otherwise." 4
A similar provision was included in subsequent taxing statutes up to
1870.' But no definitive legislation was enacted until after the adoption
of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913. Since 1913, the revenue acts
have contained some provision to prevent avoidance of tax through
the corporate form.6 The 1913 act provided that if a corporation
was "formed or fraudulently availed of" to avoid the individual income
tax by permitting "gains and profits to accumulate" rather than be
distributed, each shareholder's ratable share of the corporate income
was taxable to him "whether . . . distributed or not." 7 The fact that
a corporation was a mere holding company, or that gains and profits
were permitted to accumulate beyond the reasonable needs of the busi-
ness was prima facie evidence of a fraudulent purpose to escape the
individual income tax.8 This was to be so construed, however, only
if the Secretary of the Treasury certified that the accumulation ex-
ceeded the reasonable needs of the business. 9 The word "fraudulently"
was deleted in 1918.10 In 1921, due to doubt cast by the decision of
Eisner v. Macomber" on the constitutionality of taxing a shareholder
on income which he had not received and which he had no right to
receive, Congress abandoned the direct tax on shareholders and, in-
stead, imposed the tax on the corporation itself.12 Certification by the
Secretary was dropped as a requirement in 1924.13 Since then, mere
4. Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 117, 13 Stat. 282.
5. See R. PAul, TAXATION IN T=E UNrTEo STATES 192 (1954).
6. Id.
7. Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, § 2, 38 Stat. 166, 167.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 220, 40 Stat. 1072.
11. 252 U.S. 189 (1920). This case held that the distribution of common stock by a
corporation having only common stock outstanding could not constitutionally be taxed
as income to the shareholders.
12. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 220, 42 Stat. 247. As to Congressional doubts
concerning the constitutionality of the tax on the shareholders, see H.R. REP. No. 350,
67th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13 (1921). The constitutionality of the tax as revised was
upheld in Helvering v. National Grocery Co., 304 U.S. 282 (1938).
13. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 220, 43 Stat. 253, 277.
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unreasonable accumulation has been prima facie evidence of the pro-
scribed purpose.14
Because of the inherent difficulty of proving a mental state,15 the
provision was amended in 1938 to state that an accumulation of earn-
ings "beyond the reasonable needs of the business" is determinative of
the tax avoidance purpose, "unless the corporation by the clear pre-
ponderance of the evidence shall prove to the contrary." 16 With minor
modification this presumption has been retained ever since.17
Summary of the 1954 Code Provisions
The accumulated earnings tax is imposed upon every corporation
(except a personal holding company, a foreign personal holding com-
pany or a tax exempt corporation) "formed or availed of for the purpose
of avoiding the income tax with respect to its shareholders or the
shareholders of any other corporation, by permitting earnings and
profits to accumulate instead of being divided or distributed." 18 Two
basic presumptions are brought to bear on the proscribed tax avoidance
purpose. First, the fact that the corporation is a holding or investment
company is prima facie evidence that its purpose is to avoid the income
tax on its shareholders. 19 Second, the fact that the corporation has
accumulated earnings and profits in excess of its reasonable business
needs (including its "reasonably anticipated needs" 20) is determina-
tive of the purpose to avoid income tax on its shareholders unless the
corporation proves otherwise by a preponderance of the evidence. 2' In
the Tax Court, under certain circumstances, the taxpayer can shift the
burden of proof to the Commissioner on the issue of whether earnings
14. Id.
15. See R. KILCULLEN, TAxING ACCUMULATION OF CORPORATE SURPLUS UNDER SECTION
102, at 3 (rev. ed. 1952).
16. Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 102 (c), 52 Stat. 447, 483.
17. Ir. REV. CODE of 1954, § 533 (a) provides:
UNREASONABLE ACCUMULATION DETERMINATIVE OF PuRPosE.-For purposes of
section 532, the fact that the earnings and profits of a corporation are
permitted to accumulate beyond the reasonable needs of the business shall
be determinative of the purpose to avoid the income tax with respect to
shareholders, unless the corporation by the preponderance of the evidence
shall prove to the contrary.
18. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 532 (b).
19. Id. § 533 (b).
20. Id. § 537.
21. Id. § 533 (a).
[Vol. 12:34
1970] ACCUMULATED EARNINGS TAX
and profits have been allowed to accumulate beyond the reasonable
needs of the business.2
2
When applicable, the accumulated earnings tax is levied at the rate
of 27y, percent of the first $100,000 of accumulated taxable income,
and at 38Y2 percent of the accumulated taxable income in excess of
$100,000.23 "Accumulated taxable income" is the corporation's taxa-
ble income after certain adjustments, less the sum of: (1) the deduc-
tions for dividends paid;24 and (2) an accumulated earnings credit
which is, generally,25 the earnings retained for the reasonable needs of
the business, but not less than $100,000 during the lifetime of the cor-
poration.26
OBJECTIVES OF THE ACCUMULATED EARNINGS TAX AND CORPORATIONS
SUBJECT TO THE TAX
Because of the disparity existing between the individual income tax
22. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 534 provides in part as follows:
(a) GENaAL RULE.-In any proceeding before the Tax Court involving
a notice of deficiency based in whole or in part on the allegation that all
or any part of the earnings and profits have been permitted to accumulate
beyond the reasonable needs of the business, the burden of proof with
respect to such allegation shall-
(1) if notification has not been sent in accordance with subsection (b),
be on the Secretary or his delegate, or
(2) if the taxpayer has submitted the statement described in subsection
(c), be on the Secretary or his delegate with respect to the grounds set
forth in such statement in accordance with the provisions of such sub-
section.
(b) NoT cAmoN BY SEc=AraY.-Before mailing the notice of deficiency
referred to in subsection (a) the Secretary or his delegate may send by
certified mail or registered mail a notification informing the taxpayer
that the proposed notice of deficiency includes an amount with respect
to the accumulated earnings tax imposed by section 531. In the case of a
notice of deficiency to which subsection (e) (2) applies and which is
mailed on or before the 30th day after the date of the enactment of this
sentence, the notification referred to in the preceding sentence may be
mailed at any time on or before such 30th day.
(c) STATEMENT BY TAxPAYER.-Within such time (but not less than 30
days) after the mailing of the notification described in subsection (b)
as the Secretary or his delegate may prescribe by regulations, the taxpayer
may submit a statement of the grounds (together with facts sufficient to
show the basis thereof) on which the taxpayer relies to establish that all
or any part of the earnings and profits have not been permitted to accumu-
late beyond the reasonable needs of the business.
23. INr. REv. CODE of 1954, § 531.
24. Id. § 561.
25. Unless barred by id. §§ 1551 or 269.
26. Id. § 535(a), (c).
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rate (presently the maximum is 70 percent2 7) and the corporate tax
rate (the maximum is now only 48 percent,2 8 and dividends received
from domestic corporations are generally taxable at rates much less
than this29), individuals have often been tempted to utilize the corpora-
tion to escape the higher individual income tax rates, especially if they
are in the upper income brackets. Indeed, it is true that the after-tax
corporate income will not immediately be available to the shareholder
for his personal use. Such earnings, however, might be accumulated
in the corporation for later distribution to the stockholders through
liquidation of the corporation80 or by sale of the stock,31 either of which
would normally result in capital gain rather than ordinary income; or
the shareholders might desire to exchange their stock for that in a pub-
licly held corporation in a tax-free merger.3 2 It should also be noted
that the transfer of a shareholder's stock interest at his death results in
a new tax basis for the stock equal to its fair market value, without
imposition of a capital gain tax on the appreciation in value.33 These
are examples of the tax advantages which could be achieved by the ac-
cumulation of earnings in a corporation were it not for various restric-
tions imposed by law, of which the principal one is the accumulated
earnings tax imposed by section 531.34 The purpose of the tax, then,
is to deter the shareholders of a corporation from avoiding the indi-
vidual income tax by having the corporation accumulate earnings be-
yond its business needs, rather than distributing such earnings as divi-
dends.35
Applied literally, the language of the Code would subject any cor-
poration other than a personal holding company (domestic36 or for-
27. Id. § 1.
28. Id. § 11.
29. Id. § 243.
30. Id. § 331(a) (1).
31. Id. § 1201(b).
32. See id. § §354, 368.
33. Id. § 1014.
34. Other restrictions are imposed by the penalty taxes on personal holding com-
panies, id. §§ 542-47; by the special treatment of foreign personal holding company share-
holders, id. §§ 551-58; and by the special treatment given collapsible corporations, id.
§ 341.
35. Id. § 532(a). See H.R. REP. No. 350, supra note 12; R. PAUL, supra note 5, at
192-93.
36. I r. REV. CODE of 1954, § 532(b) (1).
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eign37) or a tax-exempt corporation 8 to the accumulated earnings tax.3'
The tax would be imposed whenever such corporation was "formed
or availed of for the purpose of avoiding the income tax with respect
to its shareholders or the shareholders of any other corporation, by
permitting earnings and profits to accumulate instead of being divided
or distributed." 41 Under this strict construction of the law, it would
not matter that the accumulation was for the purpose of sheltering a
corporation shareholder from the income tax, or that the corporation
was publicly held by thousands of small shareholders or closely held
by a few related individuals. Since the tax avoidance motive is minimal
where the shareholder is a corporation, because it is permitted an 85
percent deduction yielding an effective tax rate of about 7.0 percent
for intercorporate dividends, 41 it would be rather difficult to show the
proscribed purpose of tax avoidance in such a situation.42 The regula-
tions state that the concern of the government is directed toward cor-
porations "formed or availed of to avoid or prevent the imposition of
the individual income tax on its shareholders, or on the shareholders of
any other corporation.. . .,, 43 In other words, the tax will be imposed
only if the accumulation is for the purpose of avoiding the imposition
of a tax on individual shareholders of the same or another corporation.
The latter situation may occur where the accumulating corporation's
stock is owned by a second corporation which has individual share-
holders, and the purpose of the accumulation is to avoid the imposition
of tax on the shareholders of the parent corporation. The imposition
of individual income tax would have occurred if the accumulating
corporation had distributed its earnings to its parent corporation and
the parent corporation had, in turn, paid a dividend to its individual
stockholders.44
37. Id. § 532(b) (2). Both personal holding companies and United States share-
holders of foreign personal holding companies are subject to special penalty taxes on
undistributed income. See id. §§ 541-47, for the former, and id. §§ 551-58, for the
latter.
38. Id. § 532(b) (3).
39. Id. § 532.
40. Id.
41. Id. § 243.
42. Note, however, that as to foreign corporations, where the rate is 15% under
treaty or 30% under statute, the tax avoided by corporate shareholders is a more
significant element.
43. Treas. Reg. § 1.532-1 (a) (1) (emphasis added).
44. § 1.532-1 (a) (2). For this provision's history, see Mead Corp. v. Commissioner,
116 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1940). For application thereof, see Hedberg-Freidheim Contracting
Co. v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 839 (8th Cir. 1958).
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In practice, widely held public corporations have been exempted
from the accumulated earnings tax. As long as management is not
dominated by a few large stockholders, and individual stock interests
are so diffused that no single group effectively controls corporate
dividend policy, it is virtually impossible to impose the tax because
of the resultant difficulty of showing the presence of the prohibited
intent required by the statute.45 Two important factors tending to
negate such a showing are the presence of stockholder pressure for the
payment of dividends, and the possibility of a stockholder law suit
if the corporation were to improperly accumulate its earnings. 46 Con-
gress seemed to recognize this in 1954, when the House version of the
1954 Code proposed that corporations with more than 1500 stock-
holders be exempted from the section 531 tax if no individual or his
family owned more than ten percent of the corporation's stock.4 7 This
proposal was defeated in the Senate. 48  At least one commentator
thought that this defeat demonstrated that publicly held corporations
were subject to the, law.49 The committee reports, however, contain
language leading to the contrary view.50 To qualify for the exemption,
the corporation had to show that it met- the stock ownership require-
ment, and since the provisions of section 54451 pertaining to construc-
tive ownership were to be applied, 2 many corporations feared that
they would be unable to prove that no individual or family owned
more than ten percent of their stock. Because of this, and because
"this tax is not now in practice applied to publicly held corporations,"
the Senate Finance Committee decided that "it was desirable to remove
the exemption" which the House bill had provided. 3 Indeed, the
45. Ir. REv. CODE of 1954, § 532(a).
46. These suits may be in the form of an action to compel dividend payments as in
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919), or in the form of a
stockholder's derivative action on behalf of the corporation to recover from the
directors any section 531. tax paid. See, e.g., Mahler v. Trico Products Corp., 296
N.Y. 902, 72 N.E.2d 622 (1947); Note, Derivative Actions Arising from Payment of
Penalty Taxes under Section 102, 49 COLUM. L. Rev. 394 (1949).
47. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1954).
48. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 69 (1954).
49. R. HOLzMAw, TmE TAx ON ACCUMULATFD EARNNGS 5-6 (1956): "The very fact
that this provision was deleted from the -final language of the law is an emphatic
reminder that Congress decided that publicly-held corporations were a proper subject
of the law."
50. S. REP. No. 1662, supra note 48.
51. INT. Rev. CODE of 1954, § 544.
52.-H.R. REP. No. 1337, supra note 47 at A172.
53. S. REP. No. 1662, supra note 48.
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only reported case in which the accumulated earnings tax has been
imposed on a publicly held corporation is Trico Products.4 In that case,
since six stockholders held about two-thirds of the shares, the corpora-
tion was effectively closely held, and the courts were able to determine
that the accumulations were the result of a tax avoidance purpose. It
would, therefore, appear that "a common denominator in all section
531 cases is concentration of ownership and control of the corporation
in a small group of stockholders," r5 and that public corporations are
generally exempt from any great concern over the tax.
THE MULTIPLE TESTS: REASONABLE BUSINESs NEEDS AND TAX
AvoiiDArcE PuRPOSE
The Test of Reasonable Business Needs
Section 533 (a) 51 establishes a presumption that the purpose to avoid
taxes is present if earnings are accumulated beyond the reasonable
business needs of the corporation. Section 535(c) provides a credit in
computing accumulated taxable income for "such part of the earnings
... for the taxable year as are retained for the reasonable needs of the
business." 57 The presumption of section 533(a) is rebuttable; and
even if a corporation accumulates earnings beyond its reasonable needs,
the tax is inapplicable if it can establish that it has not utilized the
excess for the forbidden purpose.5s It is difficult for the taxpayer
to rebut the presumption of a tax avoidance purpose where the ac-
cumulation is shown to exceed reasonable business needs. 9 Although
there is no statutory definition of the term "reasonable needs of the
business," since 1954 the reasonably anticipated needs of the business
have been included.6 The regulations state that the reasonable needs
54. Trico Products Corp, 46 B.T.A. 346 (1942), afi'd, 137 F.2d 424 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 320 U.S. 799 (1943).
55. B. Brrrmt & J. EusTicF, FEDERAL INcoME TAxkTION OF CORPORATIONS AmD
SHAREHOLDERS 214 (2d ed. 1966).
56. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 533 (a).
57. Id. § 535(c).
58. Id. § 532. E.g., Bremerton Sun Publishing Co., 44 T.C. 566 (1965); Gus Blass Co.,
9 T.C. 15 (1947), appeal dismissed, 168 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1948).
59. United States v. Duke Laboratories, Inc., 337 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1964); i A.
Dress Co., Inc., v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 543 (2d Cir. 1960); Bremerton Sun Pub-
lishing Co., 44 T.C. 566 (1965); Ted Bates & Co, 34 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1476 (1965).
60. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 537. The Tax Reform Act of 1969 added two others:
the section 303 redemption needs of the business, and the excess business holdings
redemption needs of the business. Id. § 537 (a) (2) and (3).
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of the business include "the amount that a prudent businessman would
consider appropriate for the present business purposes and for the
reasonably anticipated future needs of the business." 61 Although this
does not greatly expand the statutory wording, the regulations are
helpful in furnishing the following examples of reasonable accumula-
tions:
(1) To provide for bona fide expansion of business or replace-
ment of plant;
(2) To acquire a business enterprise through purchasing stock
or assets;
(3) To provide for the retirement of bona fide indebtedness
created in connection with the trade or business, such as the estab-
lishment of a sinking fund for the purpose of retiring bonds issued
by the corporation in accordance with contract obligations in-
curred on issue;
(4) To provide necessary working capital for the business,
such as, for the procurement of inventories; or
(5) To provide for investments or loans to suppliers or custom-
ers if necessary in order to maintain the business of the corpora-
tion.62
Apart from these examples, which the regulations state are not ex-
clusive,63 others developed by case law include:
(1) The need to meet business competition; 64
(2) The need to finance employee pension or profit sharing plans; 65
(3) The need for various business risk and contingency reserves; 66
(4) The need for protection against the possible loss of customers;67
(5) The need for plant relocation; 6
(6) The need for self-insurance against loss of key employees; 69
(7) The need for surety bond requirements in taxpayer's business.70
61. Treas. Reg. § 1.537-1(a).
62. § 1.537-2(b).
63. Id.
64. John P. Scripps Newspapers, 44 T.C. 453, 470 (1965).
65. Bremerton Sun Publishing Co., 44 T.C. 566, 585 (1965).
66. Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1957)
(reserves against risks); Smokeless Fuel Co., 12 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1350 (1943) (threat
of strikes).
67. L. R. Teeple Co., 47 B.T.A. 270 (1942).
68. Id.
69. Bradford-Robinson Printing Co. v. United States, 1 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1278
(D. Colo. 1957).
70. Vuono-Lione, Inc., 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 506 (1965).
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Indeed, the reasons justifying the accumulation of earnings and profits
are as wide-ranging as modern business itself. Moreover, the business
of the corporation is not limited to that which it has carried on in the
past but includes "any line of business which it may undertake." 71
The regulations set forth the following as indications that the ac-
cumulation is beyond the reasonable needs of the business:
(1) Loans to shareholders, or the expenditure of funds of the
corporation for the personal benefit of the shareholders;
(2) Loans having no reasonable relation to the conduct of the
business made to relatives or friends of shareholders, or to other
persons;
(3) Loans to another corporation, the business of which is not
that of the taxpayer corporation, if the capital stock of such other
corporation is owned, directly or indirectly, by the shareholder or
shareholders of the taxpayer corporation and such shareholder or
shareholders are in control of both corporations;
(4) Investments in properties, or securities which are unrelated to
the activities of the business of the taxpayer corporation; or
(5) Retention of earnings and profits to provide against unrealistic
hazards.72
The fact that the transaction falls within one of the above examples
does not necessarily mean that the penalty tax of section 531 will at-
tach. The presence of one or more of these factors, however, does serve
to draw the government's scrutiny to the accumulation. 73
Since 1954, the reasonable needs of the business have included its
reasonably anticipated needs.74 This provision does away with any
requirement of an immediate need for the funds in order to justify
their retention, although the plans of the corporation must not be too
uncertain or vague.75 The regulations provide:
In order for a corporation to justify an accumulation of earnings
and profits for reasonably anticipated future needs, there must be
an indication that the future needs of the business require such ac-
71. Treas. Reg. § 1.537-3 (a).
72. Id. § 1.537-2(c).
73. See B. BrrrKEm & J. EusacE, supra note 55, at 224.
74. INr. Rav. CODE of 1954, § 537(a) (1).
75. Treas. Reg. § 1.537-1(b).
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cumulation, and the corporation must have specific, definite, and
feasible plans for the use of such accumulation7 6
If the plans for the use of the funds are vague or uncertain, suggesting
that they were only an afterthought, there arises a strong implication
that the needs were not reasonably anticipated, and the tax has gen-
erally been imposed.7 7 Subsequent events are not to be employed to
vitiate an accumulation as long as the retention of the earnings or
profits was reasonable at the close of the taxable year.78 Subsequent
events, however, may be considered in determining whether the tax-
payer actually intended to carry out its alleged plans.7 9 In other words,
the "reasonable business needs" test is to be an objective one based
upon the circumstances as they exist at the end of the taxable year, and
not as they happen to turn out afterward. Later events are to be
viewed only as bearing on the original intent at the time of the accumu-
lation.
The Test of Tax Avoidance Purpose
Section 532 states that the accumulated earnings tax applies to every
corporation, with certain statutory exceptions, formed or availed of
for the purpose of avoiding taxes on its shareholders by permitting the
accumulation of earnings and profits.8 0 Although this section does not
identify the individual or individuals whose purpose is crucial, it seem-
ingly refers to those who control the corporation through share owner-
ship or otherwise. The language of this section 532 places great em-
phasis on the subjective intent of the corporation and could easily be
interpreted to mean that the tax is to be imposed whenever a tax avoid-
ance purpose is present, whether or not it has been accomplished.8 '
Indeed, the corporation's intent has been referred to as the important
query to be answered in such cases.8 2 It is probable, however, that the
courts will not impose the tax unless actual tax avoidance has occurred."a
The presence of a purpose to avoid taxes can be inferred, however,
76. Id.
77. Cf., e.g., American Metal Products Corp. v. Commissioner, 287 F.2d 860 (8th
Cir. 1961).
78. Treas. Reg. § 1.537-1 (b) (2). See also Sterling Distributors, Inc. v. United States,
313 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1963).
79. Treas. Reg. § 1.537-1 (b) (2).
80. IxT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 532.
81. See B. BrrrnR & J. EusncE, supra note 55.
82. E.g., Young Motor Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 488 (1st Cir. 1960);
Casey v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1959).
83. See B. BTrxR & J. EusncE, supra note 55, at 214-15.
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from the fact that shareholder tax liability has been decreased by the
accumulation. It is also common practice for the courts to consider
the added tax burden on a shareholder had distribution been made as
evidence tending to show a tax avoidance purpose.8 4 The mere fact
that tax liability would have been increased by a distribution, how-
ever, does not necessarily mean that the tax will be imposed. 5 Where
the accumulation results from a mistaken although honestly held be-
lief of need for an accumulation, the tax should not be imposed under
current doctrine, since the purpose of tax avoidance is absent.86
Until recently, there was considerable dispute as to whether the law
applied where tax avoidance was merely one of the purposes for the
accumulation or whether avoidance had to be the dominant purpose.
Section 532 states that the tax applies to a corporation accumulating
earnings and profits "for the purpose of avoiding the income tax with
respect to its shareholders." 8 7 Some courts have held that the tax ap-
plies unless the corporation establishes a total absence of any tax avoid-
ance motive.88 Other courts have applied the tax unless the corporation
could show that tax avoidance was not a significant factor in the ac-
cumulation.8 9 Simply showing that avoidance was not the primary or
84. See, e.g., Trico Products Corp., 46 B.T.A. 346, 364-65 (1942).
85. R. Gsell & Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 321 (2d Cir. 1961).
86. Accord, Casey v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1959). Judge Learned
Hand in concurring stated:
I believe that the statute meant to set up as a test of "reasonable needs"
only the corporation's honest belief that the existing accumulation was no
greater than was reasonably necessary. Section 532 (a) was a penal statute,
designed to defeat any plan to evade the shareholders' taxes, and there can
be no doubt that it presupposes some deliberate purpose to do so and
is not satisfied by proving that the corporation was mistaken in its estimate
of its future "needs."
ld. at 32.
In United States v. Duke Laboratories, Inc., 337 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1964) the govern-
ment conceded that a corporation's honest but mistaken belief that its earnings were not
excessive may exempt it from section 531 liability.
87. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 532 (emphasis added).
88. Whitney Chain & Mfg. Co., 3 T.C. 1109 (1944), aff'd per curiam, 149 F.2d 936
(2d Cir. 1945). See also Bremerton Sun Publishing Co., 44 T.C. 566 (1965); Pelton
Steel Casting Co., 28 T.C. 153 (1957). The Tax Court later seemed to move away
somewhat from this position in Carolina Rubber Hose Co., 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
1159, 1171 (1965). There the Tax Court said:
[W]ithout getting into the argument whether the tax avoidance purpose
must be the sole purpose, the dominant purpose, or only one of the pur-
poses . . . we find . . . that tax avoidance to its shareholders was not a
sufficient consideration, if any, in the determination of petitioner's dividend
policy . . . to make petitioner liable for the accumulated earnings tax.
89. Trico Products Corp. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 424 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320
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dominant purpose was not sufficient. Conversely, the courts did not
require the corporation to show a total absence of an intent to avoid
taxes.90 Still other courts required that the corporation prove that tax
avoidance was not the primary or dominant motive for the earnings
accumulation. 9'
The dispute was resolved by the Supreme Court in Donruss.92 Don-
russ was a corporation engaged in profitable business activities, and all
of its stock was owned by a single shareholder. The company had,
during 1955-1961, increased its undistributed earnings by over $658,-
000, but had not paid any dividends. Several reasons were advanced
to justify the accumulation, including the need for capital and inven-
tory, increasing costs, and general economic and business risks. The
sole shareholder also expressed a desire to expand and invest in the
company's major distributor, but no concrete steps had been taken in
this direction.
In the district court, the jury found that the corporation had ac-
cumulated earnings beyond the reasonable needs of its business but
that it had not retained such earnings for the purpose of avoiding
income tax on its sole shareholder. 9 Among the instructions requested
by the Government was the following:
[I]t is not necessary that avoidance of shareholder's tax be the
sole purpose for the unreasonable accumulation of earnings; it is
sufficient if it is one of the purposes for the company's accumula-
tion policy.94
US. 799 (1943); Chicago Stock Yards Co. v. Comnmissioner, 129 F.2d 937 (1st Cir.
1942), re'Vd on other grounds, 318 U.S. 693 (1943).
90. The second circuit in Trico Products Corp. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 424 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 799 (1943) and in United States v. Duke Laboratories, Inc.,
337 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1964), and the fifth circuit in Barrow Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner,
294 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1961) held that the prohibited purpose need be only one of the
reasons for the accumulation. A district court in Fenco, Inc. v. United States, 234 F.
Supp. 317 (D. Md. 1964), aff'd per curiam, 348 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1965), interpreted
Semagraph Co. v. Commissioner, 152 F.2d 62 (4th Cir. 1945) and Smoot Sand & Gravel
Corp. v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1957) and 274 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1960)
to the same effect. Courts in Kerr-Cochran, Inc. v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 121 (8th
Cir. 1958) and World Publishing Co. v United States, 169 F.2d 186 (10th Cir. 1948)
stated that the prohibited motive had to be the "determining" purpose.
91. Young Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 488 (1st Cir. 1960), 316 F.2d 267
(1st Cir. 1963), 339 F.2d 481 (1st Cir. 1964); Donruss Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 292
(6th Cir. 1967). Donruss was subsequently reversed. 393 U.S. 297 (1969).
92. United States v. Donruss Co., 393 U.S. 297 (1969).
93. Donruss Co. v. United States, 65-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9292 (W.D. Tenn. 1965).
94. Donruss Co. v United States, 384 F.2d 292 (6th Cir. 1967).
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The court refused this request and simply instructed the jury that tax
avoidance had to be "the purpose" of the accumulations. 95
The appellate court reversed the verdict in favor of the taxpayer,
saying that "the jury might well have been led to believe that tax
avoidance must be the sole purpose behind an accumulation in order
to impose the accumulated earnings tax." 11 This court rejected the
government's proposed instruction, however, and held that the tax
applied only where tax avoidance was the "dominant, controlling, or
impelling motive" for the accumulation. 97
The issue presented to the Supreme Court was whether the taxpayer,
in order to rebut the presumption contained in section 533 (a) ,1 must
establish that tax avoidance was not "one of the purposes" for the un-
reasonable accumulation, or whether it need only establish that tax
avoidance was not the "dominant, controlling, or impelling" reason
for the accumulation. After examining the language, purposes, and
legislative history of the statute, the Court concluded that the corpora-
tion must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that avoidance
of tax on the shareholders was not "one of the purposes" of an ac-
cumulation which exceeds the reasonable needs of its business.99 The
Court believed that to adopt the test proferred by the taxpayer would
"exacerbate the problems that Congress was trying to avoid," as there
is rarely "one motive, or even one dominant motive, for corporate
decisions." 100 The taxpayer's test would make it too easy for taxpayers
to escape the tax by showing that at least one other motive was equal
in importance to tax avoidance, since such a determination could not
be made with any degree of accuracy and would depend almost en-
tirely upon the interested testimony of the corporate management.''
The Court maintained that the purpose test was still relevant since it
would serve to isolate those cases where tax avoidance did not con-
95. Donruss Co. v. United States, 65-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9292 (W.D. Tenn. 1965).
96. Donruss Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 292 at 298 (6th Cir. 1967).
97. Id.
98. INT. Rxv. CoDE of 1954, § 533(a) provides:
For purposes of section 532, the fact that the earnings and profits of a
corporation are permitted to accumulate beyond the reasonable needs of
the business shall be determinative of the purpose to avoid the income
tax with respect to shareholders, unless the corporation by the preponder-
ance of the evidence shall prove to the contrary.
99. United States v. Donruss Co., 393 U.S. 297, 301 (1969).
100. Id. at 307-08.
101. Id. at 308.
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tribute to the decision to accumulate. The Court stated that "purpose"
means more than mere knowledge, which is present in almost every
case. Thus, it is still open to the taxpayer to show that, even though
it had knowledge of the tax consequences, such knowledge did not
contribute to its decision to accumulate earnings. 0 2
The minority opinion argues that Congress chose to give the tax-
payer a "last clear chance" to prove that, despite the unreasonableness
of the accumulation, it was not due to a purpose of avoidance, and
that if the majority's test were used, the taxpayer would be denied
such a "last clear chance." 103 This argument rests on the probability
that a jury, having been instructed that avoidance need be only one
of the purposes for an accumulation, is quite likely to find that a pur-
pose of avoidance exists whenever the government shows that the tax-
payer has accumulated earnings knowing of the resultant tax savings
even though there may be evidence establishing that avoidance played
only a minor role.10 4 The minority believed that the jury should be
instructed to impose the tax only "if it finds that the taxpayer would
not have accumulated earnings but for its knowledge that a tax saving
would result." 105
Although the decision in Donruss settled the conflict as to the quan-
tum of avoidance needed for imposition of the tax once the presumption
of tax avoidance has been invoked by an unreasonable accumulation
of earnings, the decision has raised another question. What is meant
by purpose? The Court states that knowledge alone is not enough, but
that knowledge acted upon is. Where knowledge exists together with
an accumulation, however, it is quite probable, as the minority in
Donruss points out, 06 that the jury will equate this combination with
a purpose to avoid. The "but for" test of the minority would not
solve the problem either, if Congress meant for the tax to be imposed
whenever the taxpayer would have distributed earnings absent the pos-
sibility of a tax saving. For under the very test of the minority, if the
corporation accumulated the earnings for other reasons as well as for
tax savings, the tax would not be imposed. These difficulties are in-
herent in the subjective intent requirement that a purpose of tax avoid-
102. Id. at 309.
103. Id. at 310.
104. Id. at 311.
105. Id. at 313.
106. Id. at 311-12.
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ance be shown. The problem could be avoided by eliminating the re-
quirement.
A PROPOSAL TO ELIMINATE THE SUBJECTIVE TEST IN THE
IMPOSITION OF THE ACCUMULATED EARNINGS TA
Prior to 1954, if the tax avoidance purpose was found to be at all
present, the accumulated earnings tax could be imposed upon the
corporation's entire undistributed earnings for the taxable year, even
if all or a part 'of these earnings had been retained for the reasonable
needs of the business.10 7 This was altered by the enactment of the
accumulated earnings credit in 1954.118 Under this provision, no tax
is to be imposed on that portion of an accumulation which is within
the reasonable needs of the business, even if a tax avoidance purpose is
present. Therefore, if only a part of the undistributed earnings for the
taxable year is retained for the reasonable needs of the business, the tax
will be applied only to the excess earnings retained. 0 9 The 1954
amendments thereby downgraded the subjective test by making it sub-
ordinate to the objective test. Recent court decisions have tended to
reduce its importance even further. For example, the courts of appeal
in both the first and second circuits have recently held that the ob-
jective test (the "reasonable business needs" test) is the single most
important indicator in determining whether the tax avoidance purpose
is present.110 In contrast, some of the earlier decisions seemed to be
as much concerned with the subjective intent of the corporate share-
holders as with the corporate business needs."'
Even with a trend away from the subjective test, difficulties arise, as
may be seen in the discussion of the Donruss case, in determining what
is needed in addition to knowledge of tax savings to find that a purpose
of tax avoidance exists. It would seem preferable to eliminate such
107. See, e.g., R. Gsell & Co. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 321 (2d Cir. 1961); Young
Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 488 (1st Cir. 1960).
108. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 535(c).
109. See, e.g., Bardahl Mfg. Corp., 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1030 (1965); Ted Bates
& Co., 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1346 (1965).
110. United States v. Duke Laboratories, Inc., 337 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1964); Young
Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 488 (1st Cir. 1960), on remand, 21 CCEI Tax Ct.
Mem. 711 (1962), resvd and remanded, 316 F.2d 267 (1st Cir. 1963), on remand, 23
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 113, afF'd 339 F.2d 481 (1st Cir. 1964).
111. See, e.g., Cecil B. De Mille, 31 B.T.A. 1161 (1935), aff'd, 90 F.2d 12 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 302 U.S. 713 (1937); Fisher & Fisher, Inc, 32 B.TA. 211 (1935), aff'd per
curiav, 84 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1936).
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fruitless inquiries. To this end it is proposed that Congress amend the
accumulated earnings tax provisions to delete the subjective test. The
"reasonable business needs" test would then no longer be merely pre-
sumptive support of the presence of a tax avoidance purpose, but would
serve as the only test of the accumulation's taxability. Section 532 (a)
might be amended as follows:
(a) GENERAL RULE.-The accumulated earnings tax imposed by
section 531 shall apply to every corporation (other than those de-
scribed in subsection (b)) accumulating earnings and profits be-
yond the reasonable needs of the business.
Section 532(b) would not be changed. Section 533 would be deleted
from the Code. Section 537 might be amended to include further ex-
amples of reasonable needs of the business, but this does not appear
necessary in view of the extensive case law presently in existence.
This amendment appears to be in accord with the recent trends noted
above in progressively reducing the importance of the subjective test.
Moreover, the inherent difficulty in determining the presence of a tax
avoidance purpose for the imposition of the tax would be eliminated.
The change would also serve to lessen the discrimination presently
existing against closely held corporations in applying the tax. It would
no longer matter that it is much easier to prove the existence of a pur-
pose of tax avoidance in such a corporation. 12 Application of the tax
would be dependent upon whether the accumulation served the reason-
able needs of the corporation. If this were not thought to be a desirable
result, an express exemption could be made for widely held corpora-
tions.
While this amendment would simplify imposition of the tax and
probably eliminate more tax avoidance than does the present statute,
it would not penalize the corporation which accumulates its earnings
with a reasonable business objective in mind. Corporations which ac-
cumulate funds beyond their reasonable business needs without any
tax avoidance purpose are rare and, in any event, ought not to be per-
mitted such accumulation without incurring the tax.
112. See text accompanying notes 36-55 supra.
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